Editor’s Note:
On November 9, a research report titled China-Europe Relations in a Multipolar World was released in Beijing. This report, jointly authored by experts from several leading Chinese universities and think tanks, aims to outline the current state of China-Europe relations amid pivotal global changes and to provoke deeper reflection on the environment, unique characteristics, driving forces, and patterns of change in these relations. Next week, the report will also be presented at an English-language release in Brussels. The following article is an excerpt from the report’s section titled European Security Perspectives Under Two Conflicts, which examines how the conflicts in Ukraine and between Israel and Palestine have profoundly altered Europe’s security outlook and how these changes might affect Europe’s self-perception and its view of China and the world.
In the wake of intense stimuli and profound impacts from the ongoing conflicts in Ukraine and Israel-Palestine, Europe’s security perspective has undergone significant transformation. European views on military conflict, economic relationships, and soft and hard power have faced unprecedented shocks and challenges, leading to irreversible changes. These two conflicts have also had far-reaching implications for Europe’s handling of the relationship between development and security, independence and foreign reliance, as well as global governance and security architecture, resulting in adjustments within the EU’s internal power structure. Europe has entered a critical phase of transformation towards a “geopolitical Europe.”
Since the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine conflict and the renewed Israel-Palestine conflict in 2022, the security landscape surrounding Europe has experienced revolutionary changes. Europe’s security perspective has significantly evolved, with geopolitical security issues now recognized as long-term, systemic problems affecting European societies.
1. Rebalancing Economic Development and Security Needs
Before the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, Europe enjoyed nearly half a century of peace dividends. Due to an optimistic belief that “continental wars would not occur again,” European policies and resources were increasingly tilted toward economic development over security concerns. Although NATO leaders made a formal commitment at the 2014 NATO summit in Wales to spend at least 2% of their GDP on defense by 2024, a report in 2021 revealed that only ten NATO member countries met this standard. Notably, Luxembourg, Spain, and Belgium allocated only 0.57%, 1.02%, and 1.12% of their GDP to defense budgets, respectively, well below NATO standards.
However, the Russia-Ukraine conflict has significantly altered Europe’s development trajectory. Europe is now gradually treating security capability building as a prerequisite for prosperity and development, advocating a transition towards a “wartime economy,” even adopting an extreme view that “security outweighs everything.” Germany, as the EU’s largest economy, has traditionally maintained a pragmatic approach, advocating for economic cooperation with Russia. However, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz stated in a special meeting of the Bundestag that the Russia-Ukraine conflict represents a “turning point in European history,” announcing a special fund of €100 billion to strengthen the German armed forces. Following allegations of Ukrainian involvement in the sabotage of the Nord Stream gas pipeline, a German government spokesperson emphasized that, regardless of the investigation’s outcome, “this will not affect Germany’s continued support for Ukraine.”
Besides Germany, Europe is witnessing a renewed wave of “remilitarization,” shifting the balance toward security. French President Emmanuel Macron, in March 2023, called for France to actively transition to a “wartime economy.” In March 2024, the EU introduced its first European Defense Industrial Strategy and a draft Defense Industrial Plan, outlining a clear vision for transitioning to a “wartime defense industrial state.” NATO, once deemed “brain dead” during peacetime, has been “revived.” Finland and Sweden abandoned their long-standing neutrality and joined NATO in 2023 and 2024, respectively. NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg announced during a 2024 visit to the U.S. that 23 of the 32 NATO member countries met the 2% GDP defense spending target that year.
Additionally, the EU has begun to view external relations through a “security lens,” frequently using “national security” as an excuse to obstruct a series of “highly sensitive” cooperation projects, including China-Europe technological collaboration. The heightened focus on “economic security” is closely tied to this shift in the European security perspective.
2. Redistribution of EU Power and National Sovereignty
Following the outbreak of the latest Ukraine crisis, there has been a strong call within the EU for improved decision-making efficiency and unified voice in response to the crisis. In the tense security atmosphere, member states are traditionally reluctant to cede sensitive policy areas, such as foreign affairs and defense, to the EU or allow EU institutions to play a larger role. However, the decision-making weight in these areas has begun to change. EU institutions, led by the European Commission, have significantly expanded their powers through various initiatives and crisis decisions.
Firstly, the unique advantages of bureaucratic institutions have played a crucial role in responding to the crisis. During the initial stages of the crisis, especially during the sanctions against Russia, Ursula von der Leyen and her European Commission proactively communicated with the U.S. government to draft plans ahead of time, becoming “the only party fully aware of all discussions on the sanctions,” even bypassing the “RELEX” working group that addresses legal, financial, and institutional matters related to common foreign and security policies, effectively sidestepping member states’ oversight.
In June 2024, the EU approved a new “Ukraine Fund” plan, which will provide €50 billion to Ukraine for recovery, reconstruction, and modernization through 2027. Initially, the plan faced resistance from Hungary during discussions. However, Hungary eventually allowed the plan to proceed, demanding only symbolic reviews of the fund’s disbursement in phases. Subsequent disclosures during a lawsuit against von der Leyen by the European Parliament revealed that Hungary abandoned its opposition because the European Commission had promised to unfreeze part of Hungary’s EU funds. This indicates that during crises, EU institutions increasingly leverage their resources to influence member states’ voting behavior.
Secondly, EU powers have been enhanced through the strong willingness of major EU countries to advance security and defense integration into sensitive areas. After the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, the European Council held a special meeting in Versailles, where leaders emphasized that the conflict represents a “tectonic shift in European history,” advocating for strengthening European defense capabilities. They authorized EU institutions to analyze defense investment gaps and propose new initiatives to bolster Europe’s defense industry and technological foundation. The subsequent Strategic Compass initiative and related short-term policy tools facilitated joint procurement at the EU level. The EU even discussed previously sensitive issues related to member states, such as jointly issuing bonds and establishing new joint funds to finance energy and defense expenditures. In reality, without the tacit approval of member states, EU institutions would still face obstacles in expanding their powers in sensitive areas.
Thirdly, the heated anti-Russian sentiment has weakened the veto power of member states. Hungary’s relatively moderate stance towards Russia has drawn ire from many EU members and citizens. Regarding the issue of granting EU candidate status to Ukraine, the European Council confirmed this in an expedited manner and swiftly initiated accession negotiations. During the vote, Hungary was temporarily excluded from the meeting in a “walkout,” allowing the resolution to pass without unanimous consent but effectively stripping Hungary of its veto power. After Hungary assumed the rotating EU presidency, it convened a meeting on industrial policy that only seven ministers attended, with no representatives from the European Commission. Plans for a foreign ministers’ council in Budapest were also boycotted, forcing the meeting to be relocated to Brussels. An EU diplomat indicated this was a clear signal to Hungary that “Hungary does not represent the EU.”
In 2024, as EU institutions undergo a leadership transition, discussions about reforming the EU decision-making mechanism have intensified, particularly regarding replacing “unanimity” with “qualified majority” in foreign affairs, aiming to enhance the EU’s operational capabilities.
3. Balancing Independence and Dependence on the U.S.
Since the end of World War II, Europe, primarily referring to most Western European countries during the Cold War, has viewed the U.S. as its primary security guarantor. This inertia continued in Western Europe after the Cold War and was even more deeply entrenched in Eastern European countries formerly within the Soviet sphere. While benefiting from peace dividends, European countries have also accumulated a massive “defense deficit.” According to estimates by the European Commission, to address the defense investment gaps, the EU will need an additional €500 billion over the next decade.
The outbreaks of the Russia-Ukraine and Israel-Palestine conflicts have made Europe acutely aware that it cannot rely solely on its own military strength to fend off Russia’s military aggression or exert substantial influence over the Middle East. The realization that European security is heavily dependent on U.S. support has become more tangible. Simultaneously, Europe has recognized that genuine European security cannot be achieved through reliance on American support and protection alone. Moreover, with the U.S. increasingly adopting a conservative, inward-looking stance and shifting its focus to Asia, this trend is undeniable. Mark Leonard, a senior researcher at the European Council on Foreign Relations, predicts that “no matter the outcome of this year’s U.S. elections, American engagement and support for Europe will peak.”
Therefore, concerning security, Europe urgently needs to rebalance its independence and its relationship with the U.S. In the short term, due to the pressing need to enhance security and defense capabilities while facing a significant gap in self-sufficiency, Europe will continue to rely on the U.S. for security and defense, and this dependency may even increase. A report by Mario Draghi on the “Future of European Competitiveness” noted that from mid-2022 to mid-2023, 63% of the €75 billion defense procurement orders from EU countries were awarded to U.S. companies. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, approximately 55% of European arms imports from 2019 to 2023 came from the U.S., significantly up from 35% in 2014-2018. Poland has spent billions on U.S. Apache helicopters, while Germany’s €100 billion special defense fund prioritizes purchasing U.S. F-35 stealth jets. Its “European Sky Shield Initiative,” involving 21 European nations jointly procuring air defense systems, has opted for German, American, and Israeli launchers rather than awaiting the development of a European system by France and Italy. These policy directions have even sparked dissatisfaction in France. However, given the substantial depletion of European weapon stocks from assisting Ukraine, European arms production is unlikely to replenish inventories in the short term. Being part of NATO’s military framework, U.S. weapons can best address Europe’s defense capability gaps, making large-scale purchases of American arms the most practical, convenient, and secure choice.
In the long term, however, European countries need to establish an independent security and defense system to regain control. The severe polarization of domestic U.S. political ecology can lead to significant fluctuations in policy, which will greatly affect the stability of transatlantic relations. European security cannot afford the harms caused by the swing of U.S. policies or by “top diplomacy” between the U.S. and Russia. More importantly, U.S. strategic interests differ from those of Europe, and blindly following the U.S. will ultimately harm Europe’s own development and security interests. Therefore, Europe needs to gradually build its own led security system and defense capabilities. Currently, Europe is becoming increasingly aware of the key issues and is systematically advancing improvements in industrial foundations, institutional frameworks, priority capabilities, budget allocation, and project tools to strengthen independent security and defense construction.
4. Redefining Global Governance and Security Governance
Since the 21st century, European security has repeatedly faced shocks and challenges, and its dissatisfaction with the international order and global governance has been palpable. The U.S.-led global war on terror has turned Europe into a frequent target of terrorism. The global financial crisis ignited by Wall Street has left structural issues in the Eurozone unresolved. The COVID-19 pandemic has overwhelmed the EU’s once-proud healthcare system. The intensifying competition between the U.S. and China has frequently undermined Europe’s commitment to free trade and climate change responses. The geopolitical storms unleashed by the Russia-Ukraine and Israel-Palestine conflicts have shattered decades of peace in Europe, hinting at a shift in international order toward bipolar opposition.
Thierry de Montbrial, director of the French Institute of International Relations, stated, “Global governance in the broadest sense has performed poorly when humanity needs it most.” The underlying logic of achieving global governance is first to establish security governance. Post-World War II international governance has primarily been based on the victory of the Allies over the Axis powers, giving rise to an international security system centered on the United Nations Security Council. In a relatively stable security framework, countries can negotiate to address common issues such as trade, health, and climate.
Thus, in the face of dramatically changing security realities, Europe will approach global governance issues with a more pragmatic attitude, keeping a vigilant eye on the security order and leaning towards becoming an active player in security governance. In her political program as a candidate for the new European Commission president, von der Leyen emphasized that “the world is entering a geopolitically hostile era,” advocating for the need to fight for Ukraine and viewing expansion policies as essential geopolitical instruments.
In summary, Europe aims to “show its fangs” and will adopt a more assertive stance on the international stage. On one hand, Europe will concentrate resources to “accomplish major tasks.” The Russia-Ukraine conflict is currently Europe’s most pressing geopolitical issue, with its outcome set to be a structural element influencing the international order for decades to come. Thus, addressing the Ukraine issue will inevitably become a top priority in the EU’s foreign policy. The EU has mobilized substantial financial aid for Ukraine, committing or disbursing over $167 billion thus far, including €11 billion from the “European Peace Facility,” which constitutes 65% of the facility’s total. Since the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine conflict in 2022, the EU has raised the ceiling of this fund three times.
However, this heightened focus on Ukraine has somewhat diminished European investments in its southern neighbors. In January and February 2024, the EU and its member states cut €4.8 billion from long-term development and climate funds, most of which supported projects in Africa. Notably, Germany and France diverted €2.8 billion to fill their budget gaps, while the European Council shifted €2 billion to address funding shortfalls caused by Ukraine-related aid. In fact, while countries around the world are competing to host summits on Africa, the EU-Africa summit has remained stalled since the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine conflict.
On the other hand, European nations are “fishing for chips” far from home. The EU and its member states frequently appear in the so-called “Indo-Pacific region,” striving to “de-risk” in economic terms while reinforcing trade ties with countries like India and ASEAN. Militarily, they are increasingly participating in military exercises with the U.S., Japan, Australia, and the Philippines, repeatedly crossing previously uncharted behavioral boundaries, indicating Europe’s desire to position itself at the center of global power dynamics to help uphold the U.S.-led international order.
In conclusion, under the pressures of the Russia-Ukraine and Israel-Palestine conflicts, Europe’s security perspective has undergone irreversible changes. This shift has transformed transatlantic relations from emotional management to goal-oriented management, led to a decline in trust towards Russia, and prompted a transition from “distrust in the Chinese Communist Party” to “questioning coexistence.” It can be said that Europe’s confidence in the major powers supporting the international security framework has completely collapsed, and reinforcing its role as a security provider seems to be the trend. However, Europe still faces multiple obstacles and challenges in strengthening its security capabilities. Both its strategic culture and institutional mechanisms exhibit significant misalignments, indicating that Europe’s security role and corresponding capability development will remain a long-term process. Failure to achieve a successful transformation in security and defense will likely result in severe repercussions for Europe.